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Negative and Positive Freedom: Lessons from, and to, Sociology 
 
Abstract 
Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ was a milestone in the development of 
modern political theory, with his advocacy of negative freedom supporting the neo-
liberal demand for ‘freedom from’ the state. This article defends the positive 
conception of freedom by calling on the neglected insights of the sociological 
tradition. I demonstrate how Marx, Durkheim and Simmel all understood freedom to 
be a socially conditioned phenomenon, with ‘freedom from’ being an idealist fiction 
(Marx), and a recipe for anomie (Durkheim) and loss of meaning (Simmel). I argue, 
however, that positive freedom as it was theorised by the classical sociologists must 
be distinguished from the more fashionable idea of individual self-realisation and self-
identity, a notion equally susceptible to idealist constructions, and one increasingly 
targeted by Foucault-inspired critics. Instead I draw on Hannah Arendt and André 
Gorz to show how positive freedom should be theorised as a worldly, conflictual, and 
pre-eminently political affair. 
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Negative Freedom 
Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (1969a), advanced a defence 
of negative liberty which has had considerable influence. Berlin introduced a 
distinction between two conceptualisations of freedom which, in his view, expressed 
two historically rooted and philosophically elaborated attitudes to political life that 
were essentially irreconcilable. Negative liberty is the idea that people are free when 
they are unimpeded by interference from others. Believing that a minimum degree of 
negative freedom was sacrosanct, the classical English political philosophers favoured 
this conception, disagreeing only on the optimum magnitude of this freedom, with the 
more pessimistic philosophers of human nature, such as Hobbes, willing to trade more 
private liberty to the public power of the state. 
 In its classical form, negative liberty was understood to be an inherent good in 
itself, independent of its consequences. Berlin, who placed himself in this liberal 
tradition, defended negative freedom for guaranteeing the maximum possible 
opportunities to act, regardless of whether people take those opportunities or what 
virtues or goals they ultimately choose to pursue. Individuals or groups who, given 
negative freedom from their erstwhile oppressors, continue to do what they were 
previously coerced to do, would still have received, according to this conception, an 
increase in their freedom.  
Negative freedom includes the legal right to do that which social conditions 
make practically impossible (the shortage of jobs, for example, making scarce the 
employer whom the worker is legally free to contract with). Negative freedom, Berlin 
stressed, is neither the act of freedom nor the conditions for its enactment. ‘Freedom 
is the opportunity to act, not action itself’; ‘liberty is one thing, and the conditions for 
it are another’ (1969b: xlii, liii). Failure to make these distinctions, Berlin argued, 
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tempts people to remedy ‘useless freedoms’ with a rational paternalism that provides 
the conditions for a freedom that is defined so rigidly that its existence is effectively 
annulled. ‘There is a minimum level of opportunity for choice – not of rational or 
virtuous choice – below which human activity ceases to be free in any meaningful 
sense.’ (1969b: lii) 
 
Positive Freedom 
The philosophers of negative freedom understood that liberty could not be unlimited. 
To prevent the collision of private interests resulting in inequalities – whether of 
freedom itself, or of other competing values such as security or efficiency – and in 
recognition of the importance of other goods, like culture, knowledge or happiness, 
which are not the most likely outcome of unfettered choice, negative freedom was 
always to be curtailed by law. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that in Berlin’s 
account a second conceptualisation of freedom emerged apparently in conflict with 
the first. If negative freedom is freedom from being governed by others, positive 
freedom is ‘freedom to’ govern – a freedom that must logically define what it is to be 
self-governing, which must give freedom a content, a character, and make it a 
determinate activity rather than simply the opportunity to act. 
 Berlin recognised that positive freedom was an intrinsically valuable goal, if 
not a ‘fundamental human need’ (1969b: xlvii). He also acknowledged that the 
principle of negative liberty had resulted in social evils. Positive freedom was the 
more problematic conception, however, because in seeking to give specific content to 
the actions and choices of free individuals, it inevitably excludes competing goods 
(and competing conceptions of the good life), demanding instead a frictionless world 
of self-realisation devoid of painful choices and sacrifices. Even the ‘mild and 
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humane liberalism of T. H. Green’ – the Oxford don whose revitalisation of idealist 
philosophy appealed so keenly to the ‘Radical’ wing of the British Liberal Party and 
its early nineteenth-century vision of a Welfare State – was in Berlin’s view 
vulnerable to authoritarian interpretation. Green described ‘freedom from restraint or 
compulsion’ as ‘only a means to an end’, the noblest end being ‘freedom in the 
positive sense’ – that is, ‘the greater power on the part of the citizens as a body to 
make the most and best of themselves’ (1964: 51-3). ‘Green was a genuine liberal’, 
Berlin concedes, but his Aristotlean enthusiasm for self-realisation and moral 
improvement meant ‘many a tyrant could use this formula to justify his worst acts of 
oppression’ (1969a: 150, 133 n1). 
Berlin’s view was that the perverse consequences of positive freedom had 
acquired intellectual credence from ancient philosophies of self-abnegation, the 
recommendation of which was that people could liberate themselves by repudiating 
desires that could not be realised. After its early stoic and ascetic forms, this idea 
converged with the Enlightenment belief in rational laws higher than those of instinct, 
emotion or appetite. As in Kant’s theory of a transcendent subject standing outside the 
realm of natural causality, obedience to these laws, since they were the judgement of 
higher reason, could not be called coercion. From the perspective of this ‘rationalist 
metaphysics’, because reason is universal to humans, conflicts over values and goals 
can be eliminated by organising society on rational principles. The protests of 
individuals or groups who dissent from these principles can then be disqualified on 
the grounds that they have yet to realise their true or higher interests. It was precisely 
this ‘positive doctrine of liberation by reason’ which Berlin – along with Hayek, 
Popper, and other anti-communist philosophers of the post-war period – believed was 
‘at the heart of many of the nationalist, communist, authoritarian, and totalitarian 
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creeds of our day’ (1969a: 144). Only negative freedom could protect people from 
this rational monism. 
 
The Primacy of Society: Marx and Durkheim 
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ and its kindred essays were originally written between 
1949 and 1959, a period in which the Warsaw Pact, the Russian invasion of Hungary, 
and the disclosure of Stalin’s crimes had escalated ideological as well as military 
tensions between the Cold War antagonists. In the 1969 republication of these pieces 
in Four Essays on Freedom, Berlin softened his defence of the liberal orthodoxy, 
using a lengthy introduction, and new footnotes to the essays, to qualify and moderate 
his position. ‘I am not offering a blank endorsement of the “negative” concept as 
opposed to its “positive” twin brother,’ he now explained, ‘since this would itself 
constitute precisely the kind of intolerant monism against which the entire argument is 
directed’ (1969b: lviii n1). While his essay on ‘Historical Inevitability’ originally 
accused Marx and Hegel – ‘the two great prophets of destruction’ – of believing in the 
existence of inexorable, all-encompassing historical laws (1969c: 60-3), a footnote to 
a similar observation at the beginning of ‘Political Ideas i  the Twentieth Century’ 
dissociates this belief from the thinkers themselves: ‘I do not, of course, attribute this 
view to Hegel or to Marx, whose doctrines are both more complex and far more 
plausible; only to the terribles simplificateurs among their followers.’ (1969d: 1 n2) 
 Notwithstanding his debt to Hegel’s metaphysical system, Marx was, as Berlin 
certainly knew, notoriously vague about the content of positive freedom in a classless 
society – a leisurely combination of hunting, fishing, cattle-rearing and thinking, 
being pretty much as far as his and Engels’ imagination went (Marx and Engels, 
1998: 53). Doctrines of moral improvement, Engels emphasised, were transient ‘class 
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moralities’, either justifying the interests of the dominant class or expressing 
‘indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed’ (Engels, 
1969: 114-5). The end of class society would be, as Marx put it, the end of ‘pre-
history’, true history – and ‘a really human morality’ – being whatever people chose 
to make of it once they had abolished class antagonisms and the despotic division of 
labour (Marx, 1970: 22; Engels, 1969: 115). Marx was interested not in utopian 
speculation but social critique, and for this the negative freedom of bourgeois right 
was a sitting target. When feudal relations of fealty and obligation were transformed 
into contractual relations of competition and exchange, Marx argued, ‘freedom from’ 
the coercive demands of a master was secured by exposing the majority of the 
population to merciless economic forces seemingly beyond all human control. ‘Thus, 
in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than 
before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are 
less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by material forces.’ (Marx and 
Engels, 1998: 87) 
Marx’s view was not that workers’ negative economic freedom was 
inadequate, but that it was really the fictitious ideological expression of an alienated 
freedom; that is, a positive, productive freedom compelled to produce and reproduce 
the very condition – capital – of its own subjection and dependence. Whereas Berlin 
believed the negative economic rights that were enshrined in the free market 
guaranteed a pluralism of values and ends, Marx observed how under capitalism the 
diversity of needs, preferences and ends – the diversity of ‘use-values’ whose 
consumption in pre-capitalist society was the primary motivation for production and 
trade – were ultimately subordinated to the monism of value that Marx called 
‘valorisation’ [Verwertung]. The end which workers served, which transcended and 
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trivialised all concrete choices, judgements and desires, was that which is a means to 
its own quantitative expansion: namely, profit. 
 
The simple circulation of commodities – selling in order to buy – is a means to 
a final goal which lies outside circulation, namely the appropriation of use-
values, the satisfaction of needs. As against this, the circulation of money as 
capital is an end in itself, for the valorisation of value takes place only within 
this constantly renewed movement. The movement of capital is therefore 
limitless. (Marx 1976: 253) 
 
Marx was also eager to show that the apparent neutrality of exchange-value 
was a masquerade – a ‘fetishism’ – which concealed the way the so-called ‘private 
interests’ of contracting parties, far from expressing their natural autonomy, were a 
reflection and perpetuation of specific social relations of production: ‘private interest 
is itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the 
conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is 
bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means’ (Marx 1973: 156).  
Reflecting on Max Stirner’s ‘ascetic’ belief that the path to freedom lay in 
riddance of the world that impeded it, Marx and Engels reminded him that ‘freedom’ 
for the ascending bourgeoisie was prefabricated by socially constructed goals and 
interests – the competitive accumulation of capital being the overriding imperative – 
with the concept of negative freedom being the ideological reflex of these alienated 
social relationships. For Marx and Engels it was not the idea of positive freedom 
which engendered the kind of abstract and fantastical thinking that Berlin would later 
associate with totalitarian doctrines. On the contrary, it was the bourgeois fetishising 
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of ‘freedom from’ – from the yoke of serfdom or the demands of feudal patronage – 
which succoured the idealist abstraction ‘Man’, devoid of historically determined 
needs. While Stirner believed that freedom, being negative and essentially spiritual in 
character, would always feel morbidly antagonised by physical obstacles and 
limitations – its bourgeois protagonists inventing railways to escape the limitations of 
the horse and cart, only to feel impeded by the impossibility of flying – Marx and 
Engels reminded him of the material conditioning of human interests: ‘nowhere are 
railways built for the sake of the category “freedom from”; Saint Max could have 
realised this even from the fact that no one builds railways in order to free himself 
from his money’. Only an ‘inactive petty bourgeois’, removed from the labour process 
and ‘for whom railways dropped from the sky’, could entertain the utopian fantasy of 
being free from social and material reality. (Marx and Engels, 1998: 320-2, emphasis 
in original.) 
 Marx – who incidentally complained, again in The German Ideology, that 
Stirner had failed to properly ‘consult Hegel on negative and positive freedom’ (1998: 
324) – was not the only founding thinker in the sociological tradition to have 
understood the historical conditioning of private interests, choices and goals. Whereas 
Marx viewed negative freedom as something ‘negatively’ conditioned – by the 
alienated social relations of competitive individualism and class conflict – 
Durkheim’s more conciliatory stance was that negative freedom was a desirable 
achievement, but only to the extent that it was ‘positively’ conditioned by collective 
values and common moral ideals. In The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim had 
written of a ‘negative’ and a ‘positive’ form of solidarity, the first based on the 
principle of abstention, in which ‘the parties who compose it should not interfere with 
one another through discordant movements’, the second involving moral bonds of 
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sociability, commitment and co-operation. Whereas Berlin believed positive freedom 
was unthinkable without the negative freedom of the liberal tradition, Durkheim noted 
that the opposite was true: negative contractual liberties were secure only because 
they presupposed ‘obligations which have not been contracted for’. ‘In reality,’ 
Durkheim famously wrote, ‘for men to recognise and mutually guarantee rights, they 
must, first of all, love each other’. This was not love of particular empirical 
individuals, but love of the idea of the individual – the ‘cult of individual dignity’ 
(1964: 120, 212, 121, 172, 400).  
Hence it was Kant – whose ‘rationalist metaphysics’, Berlin argued, persuaded 
his disciples to propose ‘something close to a pure totalitarian doctrine’ (1969a: 152) 
– whom Durkheim (1973) applauded for having identified a form of ‘moral 
individualism’ rooted in a respect for all members of the human community. Only on 
the basis of this culture of liberal humanism, this shared reverence for the individual 
in general, could negative liberties be civilised and restrained, whether by custom or 
by laws that carried positive moral authority. ‘The theoretician may demonstrate that 
man has the right to liberty, but, whatever the value of these demonstrations, it is 
certain that this liberty can become a reality in and through society.’ (Durkheim, 
1974: 55, 58, 72) It is society, moreover, that gives the developing child the powers of 
self-discipline and moral understanding, and which, by setting limits to people’s 
appetites and defining the ideals that they can and should pursue, enables them to 
resist the tyranny of fleeting impulses and transient whims and achieve ‘a full sense of 
self-realisation’ (1961: 40). Hence ‘liberty itself is the product of regulation’ (1964: 
386), because it is through ‘the practice of moral rules [that] we develop the capacity 
to govern and regulate ourselves’. ‘Self-mastery is the first condition of all true 
power, of all liberty worthy of the name’, Durkheim asserted in his lectures on Moral 
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Education. And for this liberty to be stable and enduring, it must be aroused by a 
positive ‘faith in a common ideal’ and in ‘the pursuit of great collective ends’ (1961: 
54, 44-6, 100-103; see also 2001: 200-202). 
 
The Emptiness of Negative Freedom: Simmel 
From Durkheim’s rationalist perspective, ‘freedom from’ the blind and irrational 
forces of nature presupposed a ‘freedom to’ that could be nurtured only by the 
impersonal norms, concepts and ideals of collective life. That this positive freedom 
exacts a price – that it ‘does unceasing violence to our natural appetites, precisely 
because it raises us above ourselves’ (2001: 235) – was a frequent observation in 
Durkheim’s thinking. Georg Simmel shared this sensitivity to the costs of modern life, 
though from the perspective of German Romanticism the tragic conflict was not, for 
him, a Cartesian struggle between body and mind, nature and civilisation, so much as 
between the spirit of freedom and the cultural forms required for its articulation. ‘Life 
is inseparably charged with contradiction. It can enter reality only in the form of its 
antithesis, that is, only in the form of form.’ (Simmel, 1968a: 25, emphasis in 
original.) Yet forms of culture are not equivalent, Simmel argued. In the ‘arc that 
passes from the subject to the object, incorporates the object and returns to the 
subject’ (2004: 205), some objects feed seamlessly back into the life process, 
ripening, refining and refreshing it. In these cases, ‘the spirit reaches an objectivity 
which makes it at once independent of all accidents of subjective reproductions, and 
yet usable for the central purpose of subjective perfection’ (1968b: 45). Other cultural 
objects, especially those more typical of complex industrial societies, are resistant to 
subjective assimilation, however. They reflect – like the ‘inert facticity’ described by 
Berger and Luckmann (1967), or the ‘practico-inert’ in Sartre’s (1991) version of 
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historical materialism – what Simmel called the ‘emancipation of the objectified 
spirit’ (1968b: 46). 
 This is well-illustrated in The Philosophy of Money, where Simmel describes 
money as ‘the purest reification of means’. A colourless and heartless cultural form 
that is indifferent to particular contents, qualities and purposes, ‘money is both the 
most responsive and, because of its complete emptiness, the most irresponsive object’ 
(Simmel, 2004: 325). Echoing Marx’s Shakespearean description of money as ‘the 
universal means of separation’ (Marx, 1975a: 376-7), Simmel notes how the 
commuting of honorific social bonds into monetary exchanges enables the liquidation 
of obligations and dependencies, but at the same time encourages a retreat into the 
kind of abstract freedom that, according to Marx, Stirner had found in Hegel’s 
idealism. ‘Money solves the task of realising human freedom in a purely negative 
sense’, Simmel writes, but this is ‘only freedom from something, not liberty to do 
something’ (2004: 402, emphasis in original).  
The problem is that the freedom made possible by the market economy, by 
relieving individuals of personal duties and commitments, drains the positive 
‘direction-giving significance’ that derives from concrete relationships and things. 
The frustrated intolerance to limitations that preoccupied Stirner – which is the same 
‘exasperated infatuation’ and ‘disease of the infinite’ that Durkheim (1951: 284-9) 
called ‘anomie’ – is for Simmel the logical consequence of a purely negative freedom. 
For Simmel, the ‘insecurity and disloyalty in relation to specific possessions which is 
part of the  money economy has to be paid for by the very modern feeling that the 
hoped for satisfaction that is connected with new acquisitions immediately grows 
beyond them’, such that ‘the core and meaning of life always slips through one’s 
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hand’. This is ‘one of the reasons why the freedom of liberalism has brought about so 
much instability, disorder and dissatisfaction’ (2004: 404). 
 In Simmel’s account, positive freedom gains traction from the uniqueness of 
the objects it encounters, since it is precisely this quality which arouses the desire to 
dwell amongst and acquaint oneself with the determinate world of things: ‘an object 
can mean something to us only by being substantially something in itself; only then, 
to the extent that the object sets limits to our freedom, does it give way to our 
freedom’ (2004: 325).  
 
In itself, freedom is an empty form which becomes effective, alive and 
valuable only in and through the development of other life-contents. If we 
analyse the events by which freedom is gained, we always notice, alongside 
the formal and pure concept of freedom, a substantively determined content 
which, however, by giving it a positive significance, also contains a certain 
limitation, a directive as to what has to be positively accomplished by this 
freedom. (2004: 401) 
 
As ‘freedom is not something negative but rather is the positive extension of 
the self into the objects that yield to it’, when cultural life is dominated by 
interchangeable and essentially impersonal commodities, we encounter ‘an 
interconnected enclosed world that has increasingly fewer points at which the 
subjective soul can interpose its will and feelings’ (2004: 460). The market economy 
makes possible an unprecedented degree of ‘independence from the will of specific 
individuals’, but since the liberating power of money derives precisely from the fact 
that it makes no specific demands on its owner, it cannot call forth from the latter an 
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inner bond of commitment and devotion. Like Hegel’s slave, money surrenders to its 
master too easily; encountering no resistance, the owner’s will is indulged, excused, 
and abandoned to its own devices. ‘Wherever the purely negative sense of freedom 
operates, freedom is considered to be incomplete and degrading’, Simmel observes. 
‘This explains why our age, which, on the whole, certainly possesses more freedom 
than any previous one, is unable to enjoy it properly.’ (2004: 300, 401, 403) 
 
The Moral Conversion: Existentialism and Max Weber 
What is missing from the negative freedom of liberal economic rights is what Simmel 
referred to as the ‘sinking of roots’, or what Sartre called ‘l’engagement’. With his 
phenomenological account of the ‘nihilating’ power of consciousness, or ‘being-for-
itself’, Sartre might seem an unlikely ally to the sociological theorists of positive 
freedom.  He was, after all, often criticised for endorsing a purely negative concept of 
liberty – an ontologically inescapable ‘ready-made freedom’, as Merleau-Ponty put it, 
which (like Berlin’s so-called ‘opportunity-concept’) has ‘no need to be exercised 
because it is already acquired’ (1962: 439, 437). Although Merleau-Ponty complained 
that Sartre had ignored the need ‘to transform into actual freedom the prenatal 
freedom which is there only to condemn us’ (1974: 161), Sartre was aware that his 
description of consciousness as ‘condemned to freedom’ implied a negative 
conception of freedom devoid of social and political mediations, and that his 
philosophy might be confused with the ideology of bourgeois liberalism.  
 Already in Being and Nothingness he had, in fact, written of the need for 
individuals to undergo a ‘radical conversion’ by which they consciously chose 
freedom as their ideal practice and goal (1956: 412 n14, 581). This idea of a ‘moral 
conversion’ from a ‘negative’ to a ‘positive’ articulation of freedom – a conversion 
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which Sartre himself seemed to undergo as his philosophy moved from existentialism 
to Marxism – was then taken up and elaborated by Beauvoir (1948), André Gorz 
(1977), and Francis Jeanson (1980). The point made by each of these thinkers was 
that an individual cannot choose liberty – cannot claim authorship of that ‘negative’ 
freedom that he or she essentially is – without engaging in a liberating enterprise, and 
an enterprise is liberating not when it disposes of the individual’s dependence on the 
world but only when it deepens the rapport between the subject and its situation. 
Merleau-Ponty, again, captured the positive nature of this rapport: 
 
If freedom is doing, it is necessary that what it does should not be immediately 
undone by a new freedom; one instant must be able to commit to its successors 
and, a decision once taken and action once begun, I must have something 
acquired at my disposal, I must benefit from my impetus, I must be inclined to 
carry on, and there must be a bent or propensity of the mind. (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962: 437) 
 
 The importance of this ‘bent or propensity of the mind’ is evident in that other 
founding figure in sociology, Max Weber. It was Weber, after all, who argued that 
even the disinterested scientist must feel an ‘inward calling’ for the profession, and 
who followed Nietzsche in recognising that a science disenchanted with the false 
morality of progress could only be endured by individuals, like himself, who had 
consciously chosen the scientific vocation as their own personal faith. And this, for 
Weber, was also the moral achievement of science, which could not tell the individual 
what to do, but could help ‘to give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his 
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own conduct’, thus ‘bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility’ 
(1948: 134, 152).  
The parallel between Weber’s understanding of the social scientific vocation 
and Sartre’s  (1956: 626-7) description of an ‘existential psychoanalysis’ aimed at 
‘revealing to us the ideal meaning of all human attitudes’ and showing ‘to the moral 
agent that he is the being by whom values exist’, is uncanny. Both perspectives 
support Charles Taylor’s contention that the ‘opportunity-concept’ of negative 
freedom defended by Berlin cannot be plausible unless individuals have already 
achieved some degree of positive self-realisation, removing the ‘internal’ barriers to 
their freedom by learning to distinguish and account for those desires which are most 
valuable and authentic to them. The meaningful exercise of those negative liberties 
secured by the bourgeois revolutions presupposes, in other words, the positive 
accomplishment of self-understanding and practical commitment (Taylor, 1985). 
 
The Politics of Self-Realisation 
In Erich Fromm’s view it was precisely this activity of self-realisation, this positive 
exercise of freedom, which had not kept up with the development of negative 
freedom, that is, with the freedom from the constraints of nature, custom and social 
position whose transcendence was the great achievement of the Reformation and 
capitalism. We are, Fromm wrote in Escape from Freedom, ‘fascinated by the growth 
of freedom from powers outside of ourselves and are blinded to the fact of inner 
restraints, compulsions, and fears, which tend to undermine the meaning of the 
victories freedom has won against its traditional enemies’ (1941: 105). While Berlin 
(1969a: 128) marvelled at the rational ‘fiery individualism’ nurtured by the highly 
disciplined communities of ascetic Protestantism, Fromm suggested that the salvation 
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anxiety arising from the puritan’s belief in the sordidness of human nature and from 
the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, actually gave rise to the kind of feverishly 
irrational activity that we would now knowingly associate with ‘compulsive 
neurotics’. Repetitive behaviour, obsessive counting and ordering, is for Fromm a 
psychological recipe for divining one’s security and fate in a world that one already 
knows is out of one’s control. The Protestant reformers thus ‘psychologically 
prepared man for the role which he had to assume in modern society: of feeling his 
own self to be insignificant and of being ready to subordinate his life exclusively for 
purposes which were not his own.’ For Fromm, it was not positive freedom but its 
absence which led people to flee the isolation and helplessness of negative freedom 
and surrender instead to totalitarian movements promising deliverance from the 
turmoil of capitalist modernity. ‘Thus freedom – as freedom from – leads into new 
bondage.’ (Fromm, 1941: 92, 111, 257) 
 Today, of course, such bondage seems a distant and unlikely threat, and 
Fromm’s ruminations on the poverty of the modern self and its susceptibility to 
inauthenticity and conformism would strike many readers as quaint, if not frankly 
patronising. The post-war economic boom raised the confidence of a new generation 
of workers and consumers, and created a more liberal social and psychological 
landscape with plentiful opportunities for therapeutic self-understanding and 
individual fulfilment. Giddens registered this change at the level of political 
discourse, distinguishing between an older ‘emancipatory politics’ whose protagonists 
were ‘concerned with the liberation from inequality or servitude’, and a new ‘life 
politics’ or ‘politics of self-actualisation’, which is concerned with personal 
responsibility, global interdependency, and life decisions (1990: 156). For Giddens, 
the new politics of positive freedom grew out of the achievements of negative 
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freedom. The emergence of life politics ‘presumes (a certain level of)… emancipation 
from the fixities of tradition and from conditions of hierarchical domination’ (1991: 
214). Its essential task is to ask ‘those moral and existential questions’ which are 
unanswerable by science and ‘repressed by the core institutions of modernity’ (1991: 
223) – questions which, incidentally, Weber believed Tolstoy had already formulated 
with perfection: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’ (Weber, 1948: 143).
1
 ‘This is’, Giddens concedes, ‘a version of the old distinction between “freedom 
from” and “freedom to”, but “freedom to” has to be developed in the light of a 
framework of utopian realism.’ (1990: 156) 
 Since it goes beyond the ‘opportunity’ to choose and addresses itself, instead, 
to what we should choose, the modern politics of self-actualisation described by 
Giddens and prefigured in Fromm’s humanism seems to represent a welcome 
resurgence of the neglected ideal of positive freedom. Its most obvious origin is the 
social and cultural revolution of the 1960s – though it probably has much longer 
historical roots, at least according to Campbell’s (1987) account of that ‘other’ 
Protestant ethic which gave rise to the Romantic sensibility associated with modern 
consumerism. The post-war growth in incomes and leisure time, the correlative 
diversification of lifestyle choices, the expansion of higher education and, with it, a 
proliferating aptitude for questioning, self-questioning, and self-discovery, and post-
Taylorist changes in the nature of work and the management of labour, were some of 
the material and intellectual factors whose ‘elective affinity’ gave rise to what 
Honneth (2004) has described as a ‘new individualism’ centred on the positive 
accomplishment of authenticity and self-realisation. 
 The fact that the maturation of these trends also coincided with the economic 
revolution of neo-liberalism, however, makes for cautionary analysis. Such caution 
Page 17 of 29 Sociology Paper For Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 18
has indeed a venerable history, particularly amongst American commentators. Herbert 
Marcuse, for example, worried that the liberalisation of social attitudes in the 
prosperous West had become a form of ‘repressive tolerance’, a kind of controlled or 
repressive de-sublimation of desire that had converted the radical need for freedom 
into commodity-friendly impulses, enabling capitalism to ‘extend liberty while 
intensifying domination’ (1964/1991: 72; 1965). Marcuse’s fears were not too 
different to those of Richard Sennett (1977/2002), who interpreted the introspective 
politics of authenticity as symptomatic of a crisis of public culture and an 
enfeeblement of the will necessary to face the knocks and challenges of genuine 
political action. In a similar vein, Russell Jacoby condemned the ‘social amnesia’ of 
those Freudian revisionists who had encouraged a ‘politics of subjectivity’ devoid of 
dialectical analysis, the legacy of which was a commodified image of the individual 
as an ‘atomised particle’ promised an ‘afterlife as an advertisement for itself’ (1975: 
105). It was Christopher Lasch (1979) who famously brought these themes together, 
denouncing the spread of a ‘culture of narcissism’ and a cult of ‘pseudo-self-
awareness’ that had, by cutting individuals off from the real conditions of their 
existence, made them even more prone to the ‘social invasion of the self’. 
 In France, too, the failure of May ’68 had prompted a wave of anti-humanist 
philosophical browbeating (see Ferry and Renaut, 1990). Régis Debray, for example, 
saw the cunning ruse of consumer capitalism at work in the cultural revolutionaries’ 
rejection of social boundaries and conventions: 
 
What first appeared as constraints on individual existence turned out to be 
constraints on turning the entire social field into commodities…Only a blaze 
of subjectivity could impose the law of the marketable object on those who 
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rejected it…The arrangement was made with the agreement of the future 
victims, whose consent could only be extracted in the form of disagreement. 
Order by way of revolt. The sincerity of the actors of May was accompanied, 
and overtaken, by a cunning of which they knew nothing…[T]he May 
revolutionaries were the entrepreneurs of the spirit needed by the bourgeoisie. 
(1979: 48, emphasis in original) 
 
 Of course it was Foucault and his followers who took this suspicion of 
subjectivity to its logical conclusion, theorising modern power as a productive force 
that constructed the very self whose freedom many among the New Left were 
claiming as an entitlement to self-actualisation. A Foucauldian genealogy of freedom 
would almost certainly find that negative and positive freedom have rarely been the 
antagonists that Berlin imagined. After all, Berlin himself recognised the need for 
states to prevent negative freedom from endangering itself, and, as Honneth (1999) 
points out, he combined his own defence of negative liberty with an emphasis on the 
right to cultural belonging, implying that the positive freedom to belong to a 
community of shared values was the precondition for the egative freedom he so 
famously championed. Before him, classical liberals like John Stuart Mill and Adam 
Smith were inclined to promote negative liberty not as an end in itself but as the most 
effective means for the cultivation of specific moral sentiments and virtues of 
character and community which were assumed to be beyond question. Even 
Durkheim’s favourite utilitarian exemplar, Herbert Spencer, had argued that social 
equilibrium in advanced societies presupposed the adaptive acquisition of altruistic 
sentiments and a concern for the liberty of others, suggesting, as Offer (2010: 179-95) 
observes, a version of ‘moral individualism’ not dissimilar to Durkheim’s. In 
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structural terms, the negative freedom of the market economy was, as Karl Polanyi 
(1957) showed, a positive accomplishment of the mercantile state, just as the 
enterprise society of more recent times, disguised as natural and spontaneous in neo-
liberal discourse, has been constructed by ‘an active, intense, and interventionist 
social policy’ aimed, amongst other things, at transforming the worker’s negative 
freedom of exchange into the positive obligation to be self-productive, to be ‘an 
entrepreneur of himself’ (Foucault, 2010: 160, 226).  
From their very inception, in other words, the negative economic liberties of 
capitalism were shaped, moderated and mediated by welfare policies and regulatory 
laws, and by standards of civility and norms of responsibility, discipline and self-
restraint, which provided the language of personhood and the ‘technologies of the 
self’ integral to the definition of what it meant to be a free and enterprising individual. 
We are, in Nikolas Rose’s words, ‘governed as much through subjectification as 
through objectification’ (1999: 95). Negative freedom and its ‘positive’ regulation are, 
from this perspective, two sides of the same coin – the currency of which, since we 
must now recognise that we are ‘governed through our freedom’, obliges us to 
‘abandon the political calculus of domination and liberation’ (Rose, 1999: 95, 62). 
 
Self-Identity is not Positive Freedom 
Can we afford to be so sanguine? Has neoliberalism truly reconciled the cultural 
contradiction between the performance principle and the leisure principle that Daniel 
Bell (1976) suggested could be the undoing of consumer capitalism? Or worse, has 
Berlin’s fear regarding the dangers of positive freedom actually materialised, albeit in 
the shape of the self-regulated and enrolled worker and consumer, rather than the 
oppressed subject of the totalitarian state? We would have to answer in the affirmative 
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if the culture of authenticity and self-realisation described above really corresponded 
to what the classical sociologists understood by ‘positive freedom’. If there is reason 
to doubt this, then it is reason obscured by the tendency to conflate freedom with 
individualism, and to reduce positive freedom to the assertion of self-identity. 
‘Emancipatory politics is a politics of life chances’, Giddens writes. ‘Life politics’, by 
contrast, ‘is a politics of identity’ (1994: 90-1). Even Foucault (1988, 1991), flirting 
with an ethical idea of freedom in his final years, fell into this trap, reducing freedom 
to expressive ‘practices of the self’, and ignoring that ‘practical-critical activity’, that 
political praxis, by which people act collectively to change the world rather than just 
interpret their place in it (Marx, 1975b).  
Retaining the distinction between positive freedom and self-identity is 
important because, although we might think of ‘identity work’ as a social enterprise 
that cannot be conducted in complete isolation, when self-identity is an individual 
project then society is conceived as a means for the achievement of what is essentially 
an anti-social goal. In sociological terms, this is a negative, not a positive, freedom; to 
use Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, it is an expression of ‘exit’ from, rather than 
‘voice’ for, the shaping of the social good. This remains the case even where personal 
expression is amplified by social media. As Malcolm Gladwell observes, digital 
networking technologies rarely foster those strong bonds of loyalty and commitment 
that give people the confidence to ‘persevere in the face of danger’ – that is, to put 
their ‘identity’ at risk in order to achieve a more meaningful social goal. They make it 
‘easier for activists to express themselves, and harder for that expression to have any 
impact’ (Gladwell, 2010: 49). 
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Positive Freedom and the Public Sphere 
Self-identity and individual self-realisation is not positive freedom because the latter, 
as the founders of the sociological tradition better understood, is a commitment that 
places the world, not the self, at the centre of one’s concern; it expresses that 
‘wordliness’ which Hannah Arendt regarded as the hallmark of the political actor. 
Arendt described ‘freedom from politics’ as ‘one of the most important negative 
liberties we have enjoyed since the end of the ancient world’ (1990: 280). But she also 
insisted that ‘liberation and freedom are not the same’, that ‘the notion of liberty 
implied in liberation can only be negative’, and that positive freedom could only 
unfold through ‘participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm’ 
(1990: 280, 29-33). Arendt also denounced the long-standing identification of 
freedom with ‘sovereignty’ – ‘the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and 
mastership’ more appropriate to the solitary activity of the maker (1958: 234-5) – 
arguing that Marxism as much as liberalism was guilty of this mistake, the fetishising 
of the worker-as-creator finding its counterpart in the utilitarian defence of the 
sovereign consumer. Since freedom, for Arendt, was by definition a political affair, it 
could only be realised by the plurality of actors who inhabit the public sphere, and 
whose differing purposes and perspectives mean that no individual can be the absolute 
master of the social world, nor the final arbiter of its meaning. ‘Under human 
conditions, which are determined by the fact that not man but men live on the earth, 
freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they cannot even exist 
simultaneously’, she wrote. ‘If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they 
must renounce.’ (1977: 164-5) 
As a political theorist Arendt wanted to extricate the concept of freedom from 
economic and productivist interpretations, to resist the slide towards subjectivism and 
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the ‘worry and care about the self’ that she believed Weber had identified as the 
motivational origin of capitalism, and to reinsert the adjective ‘public’, which had 
been a standard qualifier until the phrasing of the Declaration of Independence, into 
the ‘happiness’ that American citizens had claimed the private right to pursue 
(Arendt, 1958: 254; 1990: 127-9). As Sennett, a former student of Arendt, defended 
the eighteenth-century understanding of the difference between public life on the one 
hand, and personal needs and self-identities on the other: ‘“Public” behaviour is a 
matter, first, of action at a distance from the self, from its immediate history, 
circumstances, and needs; second, this action involves the experiencing of diversity.’ 
The public sphere is ‘the forum in which it becomes meaningful to join with other 
persons without the compulsion to know them as persons’ (1977/2002: 87, 340). 
The French social theorist André Gorz was also a long-running critic of 
productivism and a famous advocate of a ‘post-work’ society in which culture and 
politics are civilised and reinvigorated by an abundance of time. Less well known 
than his political writings is his intellectual self-portrait, The Traitor, which was first 
published in the same year as Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958). What makes 
The Traitor particularly relevant to this discussion is that it traces, in a uniquely 
personal way, the process by which the individual’s search for positive freedom, if it 
is to be at all successful, leads away from the self towards the world of others. It 
shows, in fact, how even somebody deeply committed to French existentialism – and 
to that Sartrean view of the ‘nothingness’ of the self that MacIntyre (1985: 32-3) 
condemned as the apotheosis of the dominant ‘emotivist’ conception of the individual 
– was able, by a literary endeavour that was both self-analysis and public engagement, 
to renounce his sovereignty and find himself outside himself, so to speak, in an 
uncertain and many-sided world.  
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Combining existential psychoanalysis with historical materialism, The Traitor 
documents Gorz’s attempt to accomplish his own ‘moral conversion’ from negative to 
positive freedom. Beginning with a description of his own ‘nullity complex’, which 
originally attracted him to nihilism and made Sartre’s notion of l’engagement seem 
implausible, Gorz takes the reader on a journey of self-reflection the surprising 
conclusion of which is not the establishment of a definitive identity or authentic self, 
but rather the realisation that freedom is something out there, in the world. It is 
because this world is always shared with other people that one can find one’s place in 
it only by choosing to do more than what one’s solitary will can account for: ‘a 
situation, provided one assumes it altogether, an action, provided one persists in it, 
always give back more than one puts into them and lead by their objective logic 
beyond one’s original intentions’ (1989: 271). Just as positive freedom, for Simmel, 
was impossible unless the object of that freedom displayed sufficient resistance to be 
handled and assimilated, so one cannot, as a political actor, enjoy the traction of 
positive freedom without a rapport with the different and often conflicting values and 
intentions of others.  
 
We must want action to exceed its intention, for this is the price of its reality. 
We must want to be engaged by others more deeply than we thought or could 
be by ourselves. But to be capable of really wanting this (instead of producing 
merely an imaginary and vacant will, masking fatalism), we must still do so 
knowingly; we must know the total situation in which action, once performed, 
will take its effect, the side and the direction on which we want to be engaged. 
(Gorz, 1989: 272) 
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A half-Jewish refugee from Nazi-occupied Austria, it was Gorz’s displaced 
sense of identity which led him to the realisation that he was on the side of the 
dispossessed, for ‘when a man is evicted, imprisoned for his opinions, censored, 
deported, boycotted, gagged, starved, it is I who am the target’ (1989: 265). Arendt, 
too, argued that in a conflictual world one cannot engage in political practice without 
taking sides, scorning those who believed abstract moral principles and appeals to 
human rights could answer, for example, the threat of Nazism. ‘If one is attacked as a 
Jew’, she said in an interview in 1964, ‘one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a 
German, not as a world-citizen, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man, or whatever. 
But: What can I specifically do as a Jew?’ (Arendt 1994: 12) Both thinkers defended a 
notion of positive freedom that avoided moralising idealism – such as that which 
characterised the ‘new Liberalism’ that dominated late Victorian England under the 
influence of T. H. Green – as well as the false universalism that Berlin, and indeed 
Arendt (2002), believed had made Marx’s ideas susceptible to totalitarian use. Both 
understood that positive freedom was a political affair, and that politics is not the 
expression of an authentic identity nor the unity of a common will, but rather the clash 
and contestation of interests – the latter being, as Arendt often pointed out, that which 
literally stands between individuals, which summons them to act in concert, but which 
relates and separates them at the same time. Both understood, finally, that positive 
freedom was a beginning, not an end, and that it binds us to an uncertain future – a 
future we can never fully foresee, but to which we are, nonetheless, engaged, 
accountable and committed. 
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1
 Although many of his novels and essays raise such questions, perhaps most 
memorable is Anna Karenina, where Tolstoy’s alter-ego, Levin, having grown weary 
of the contrivances of his gentry lifestyle, asks: ‘what shall I do? How shall I do it?’ 
And later, realising his brother is dying and recognising for the first time his own 
mortality: ‘I am still alive: what am I to do now?’ 
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